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Vehicle Currencies and the Structure of International Exchange
This paper is concerned with the reasons why some currencies, such as
the pound sterling and the U.S. dollar, have come to serve as "vehicles" for
exchanges of other currencies. It develops a three—country model of payments
equilibrium with transaction costs, and shows how one currency can emerge as
an international medium of exchange. Transaction costs are then made
endogenous, and it is shown how the underlying structure of payments limits,
without necessarily completely determining, the choice and role of a vehicle
currency. Finally, a dynamic model is developed, and the way in which one
currency can displace another as the international medium of exchange is
explored.
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Introduction
Most work in international monetary theory assumes a world in which there
are only two countries and two currencies. While this is a useful simplifica-
tion for many purposes, it does make it impossible to consider two interesting
aspects of the international monetary system. One aspect is what we might call
the structure of payments. In a world of more than two countries, each country
will run balance of payments surpluses with some countries, deficits with others,
even when its overall payments are in equilibrium. This multilateral struc-
ture of payments will often be of considerable economic interest. The other
neglected aspect of the international system is what we might call the
ture of exchange. People who want to exchange one currency for another will
not necessarily make the exchange directly. They may make the exchange by way
of some third currency, which becomes a "vehicle" for the transaction. His-
torically, certain currencies —thepound sterling before 1914, the U.S. dol-
lar in recent years —havecome to be widely used as vehicle currencies. To
put it another way, these currencies have served as international media of
exchange. The purpose of this paper is to examine why some currencies take
on this special role.
There is an obvious parallel between the role of a vehicle currency in
international exchange and the role of money in domestic exchange. In each
case people choose to engage in indirect rather than direct exchange. When
we ask why currencies are not exchanged directly; why one currency pre-
dominates in indirect exchange; and what determines which currency takes on
that o1e, we are raising issues very similar to those we raise when we ask
why households engage in monetary exchange instead of barter; why some one
commodity tends to emerge as a medium of exchange; and why certain commodities
(gold, silver, furs, cigarettes) are more suited for this role than others.2
By bringing up familiar issues in a different context, the study of inter-
national exchange can cast a new light on old insights. For example, I will
show that there must be indirect exchange if countries' payments are not bi-
laterally balanced. This, if one thinks about it, is just the counterpart in
international exchange of Jevons' lack of "double coincidence of wants."
Other parallels will appear in the course of the pp•i
It is obvious that the international structure of exchange must depend
crucially on transaction costs. Since it is notoriously difficult to integrate
such costs into economic models, one might expect thatany analysis of the
structure of exchange will have to b extremely complex. This need not be the
case, however, if one is willing to look at illuminating special cases instead
of trying for a general model. In this paper I will try to set outas simple
a model as possible of the structure of exchange. At each point assumptions
will be chosen to make the next step in the analysis aseasy as possible. This
process of buying clarity at the expense of realism means that this paper must
be regarded as a preliminary study. Nonetheless, the results seem intuitively
plausible, and look as though they ought to generalize.
The basic model of this paper is one in which there are three countries,
the minimum necessary for indirect exchange. Section I analyzes the model for
the case in which there are no transaction costs. In this case the structure
of payments can be determined, but the structure of exchange is indeterminate.
Transaction costs are introduced in Section II, and it is shown how the struc-
ture of these costs determines the structure of exchange. Section III then
allows transaction costs to depend in turn on the structure of exchange. This
section shows how, under plausible assumptions about the nature of this depen-
dence, the underlying structured payments limits the choice of vehiclecurrency.3
Finally, Section IV develops a dynamic model of the development of the exchange
structure.
I. The Hodel Without Transaction Costs
Consider a world consting of three countries: A, B, and C. Each coun-
try has its own currency, the Alpha in A, the Beta in B, and the Gamma in C.
There are three exchange markets on which Alphas and Betas, Betas and Gammas,
and Gammas and Aiphas can be exchanged. We will call these the ciB, By, ind yct
markets respectively. For the purposes of this section we will assume that ex-
changing currencies is costless.
Let us define E8 as the price of Aiphas in terms of Betas,EFY as the
price of Betas in terms of Gammas, and so on. Then because transactions are
costless, arbitrage will ensure that the costs of acquiring a currency directly
are the same as the costs of acquiring it indirectly, via the third currency.
This condition can be written as
E E E =1 (1)
ciB By ycx
These exchange rates will be determined by the supply and demand forcur-
rencies. I will assume that the relevant variables are flow demands andsup-
plies. This goes against much recent literature on exchange rates, which views
exchange rates as determined by the requirements of stock equilibrium. The
only justification for the treatment here is simplicity. Asset market equilibrium
in the presence of transaction costs is very difficult to model, while ifwe
are willing to adopt a flow model the analysis is quite easy. The analysis here
should therefore be regarded as preliminary, with the integration of this
theory with the "asset" view of exchange rates a piece of pending business.
The demand for and supply of currencies, then, will be assumed to arise4
from the desire of residents of the three countries tomake payments to other
countries. Residents of A wanting to make payments to B,for example, will
have to acquire Betas. The currency markets will clear if thedemand for each
currency by foreign residents equalsthe supply from domestic residents want-
ing to make payments in foreign currency. Let usdefine as the desired
payment by residents of A to B, measured in Betas,similarly BC is the desired
payment by residents of B to C, and so on.In each case we viii assume that
'desired payments depend both on the exchange ratesand on a vector Z of other
varaibles, which will be taken as exogenous. We canwrite the conditions of
equilibrium in the currency markets as
E; Z) ÷P(E,E; Z)
(2)
Earp(E
Ea; Z) + .PAC(Ea
Ea; Z) for Aiphas;
p(E, Eya; A)
+ PCB(EcxBp E; Z)
(3)
E13. PBA(E, Eya;Z) + E81. PHC(Ea8 E1; Z)forBetas; and
PAC(EP Ea; z)
+PBC(E, E; Z) (4)
E. PcA(E, Eya;
Z) ÷
EYB
•PcB(Ea,E; Z)for Gammas. In each case
we have written a condition of aggregatebalance of payments equilibrium. Be-
cause of budget constraints, if any twocountries are in balance of payments
equilibrium, the third must alsobe in balance. Notice, however, thatthere is
no reason why countries mustbe in bilateral balance. If, for example,
P >EP ,i.e.,C runs a balance of payment surpluswith A, we can still
AC yctCA
have an equilibrium if A runs an offsettingsurplus, and C an offsetting
deficit, with B.E
a
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Figure 1 illustrates the determinationof the system of exchange rates
under the assumption that the currencies are grosssubstitutes. The horizontal
axis measures the price of Aiphas in termsof Betas, the vertical axis the
price of Aiphas in terms of Gammas.The lines ctcz, 88 and yy lines represent
positions of balance of payments equilibriumfor A, B, and C respectively.
Wairas' Law assures that they intersect at a single point.
Now let us consider the structure of paymentsand the range of possible
structures of exchange. It will be helpfulif we choose units so that the
equilibrium exchange rates are all equalto one. We can then express payments
arbitrarily in any of the currencies. Giventhis normalization, the structure
of payments will look like thatillustrated in Figure 2.
In the figure, payments by residents
of one country to residents of another
are indicated by arrows. A isshown as running a surplus of I in its exchange
with B; we can relabel B and C if necessary tomake this true. The figure
then shows that, to maintain balance of paymentsequilibrium, B must run a sur-
plus of I with C, and C a surplusof I with A. Jhile payments need not be
bilaterally balanced, then, there is a sortof conservation of imbalancC. Once
we specify A's surplus with B, wehave also determined the imbalances be-
tween B and C and between C and A. (Thisis a special feature of three—country
models).
Our next task is to consider what structuresof exchange are possible
given this structure of payments. Obviouslythe structure of exchange is not
determinate In the absence of transaction costs.But there are limits on the
range of possibilities. In particular,it will not be possible to carry out
the payments in Figure 2 solely throughdirect exchange. If everyone tried to
acquire the desired foreign currencyin a single transaction, there would be9
an excess demand for Alphas on the cxB market, an excessdemand for Betas on
the y market, and an excess demand for Gammas on the -market.So some
indirect exchange must take place because, as already pointed out,countries
will not usually have a "double coincidence of wants.'t
What kinds of structure of exchange are possible? There are obviously
infinite possibilities —forinstance, one might exchange Gammas for Aiphas
and back again seventeen times, etc. —butonce we introduce transaction
costs, there will turn out to be only two typesof exchange which can actually
arise. An example of the first type is given in Figure 3, wherethe two—
headed arrows represent the volume of transactions on the cz, y,and ya
markets. In this example the residents of C make paymentsof I to B indirectly,
first purchasing Alphas and then exchanging these for Betas. They continue to
purchase S —IBetas directly, however. At the same time residents of B and
A engage only in direct exchange. As is apparent from Figures 2 and 3, this
clears all three currency markets, by increasing the supply of Gammas on the
yct market and the supply of Aiphas on the c&$ market. Since this structure
of exchange involves indirect exchange only for the imbalance in payments, let
us call this a case of partial indirect exchange using Alphas as the vehicle
currency, with the understanding that it is the payments imbalance I which is
indirectly exchanged. Clearly, we can have partial indirect exchange with
any one of the three currencies as vehicle.
Figure 4 gives an example of the other possible kind of exchange structure.
In this case all payments between B and C are made indirectly, through the
medium of Aiphas. The y market disappears, while the ciB and yci markets have
he indicated volume. Since all three countries are in balance of payments
equilibrium, it is obvious that both existing currency markets clear. Let10
us call this a case of total indirect exchange, with Alphas as the vehicle
currency. Again, we can also have total indirect exchange with Betas or
Gammas as the vehicle.
To summarize: I have defined two kinds of structure of exchange, partial
indirect exchange and total indirect exchange. Each type of structure in-
volves the use of one currency as a "vehicle" for indirect transactions. So
we have to determine which currency is the vehicle and which kind of exchange
structure occurs. To do this we must now introduce transaction costs.11
II. Transaction Costs and flxchange
In this section I show how transaction costs can determine the structure
of exchange. This analysis relies on the assumption that transaction costs
are "small," so that we can use a concept of approximate equilibriumwhich
will be defined in a moment. In essence what this concept allows us to do is
determine the structure of exchange while ignoring any feedback from the
structure of exchange to the structure ofpayTnents.'
Let us begin by describing transaction costs. I will assume that in each
of the three markets transactors must pay a brokerage fee proportional to the
size of the transaction. This proportion will be t ,t ,andt in the
ciBy
cz, y, andmarkets respectively. It will be assumed (countrieswill be label-
led such that) tand tare both less than t •Thiswill, as we will see,
ya
insure that the Alpha is the vehicle currency.
The way these transaction costs will work is to worsen the effective ex-
change rate one gets. Thus if is the exchange rate on the ciB market, a
transactor purchasing Betas will actually get only E8(l —tB)Betas per
Alpha; a transactor purchasing Aiphas will get only E(l —taB)Aiphas per Beta.
Because of the transaction costs, the arbit'ige condition (1) will no
longer hold exactly. Instead there will be a deviation from triangular arbit-
rage,
DE E E,Ll
ci8Byyci (5)
I will call D, which may be either greater or less than one, tha clockwisdom
of exchange rates. The reason for the name is that an increase in the value of
D makes indirect exchange more attractive compared with direct exchange if the
indirect exchange proceeds clockwise in Figures 3 and 4, less attractive if
the indirect exchange proceeds counterclockwise. Consicer, for example, an
exchange of Aiphas for Gammas. In direct exchange, the exchange rate is12
1/E1. In indirect exchange,clockwise via Betas, the rate is EEBy. There
will thus be a bias in favor of Indirect exchange if E E>lIE,thatis, aBy
if E E E=D>1.On the other hand, an exchange of Betas for Gammas
ciB By yci
takes place at a rate directly, whil2 the counterclockwise indirect ex-
change takes place at a rate 1/EBEY; thusthere is a bias against indirect
exchange if >1/EE
that is, EciBEBIEYa =D>1.Clearly, individuals
deciding between direct and indirect exchange willtake into account both
transaction costs and the clockwisdóm of exchange rates.
Using the concept of clockwisdom we can now proceed to analyzeequilibrium.
'Yhat I will derive here is an approximate equilibrium, which willbe close to
the actual provided transaction costs are small. The approxiTnateflesS comes
from considering only the effect of transaction costs on the way payments are
made, ignoring the effect of these costs on the paymentsthemselves. Another
way of saying this is to say that transactioncosts are taken to affect the
structure of exchange, but that the structure of payments istaken as given.
Specifically, let us define the equilibrium concept as follows.We will
consider an approximate equilibrium to be (I) a set of choices of Indirect vs.
direct exchange which would clear the three currency markets if there were no
transaction costs, together with (ii) a clockwisdotn D in the exchange rates
which leads people to make those choices.
Given this concept of equilibrium, we can now state the relationship
between transaction costs and the structure of exchange. Recallthat t and
tare both assumed to he less than t •Thenwe can state that:
By
(i) The Alpha will be the vehicle currency
(ii) If (1 —t)(1 —t)< 1—t—i.e.,if indirect exchanpe is more
Ia By
costly than direct —theequilibrium structure will be one of partial indirect13
exchange, as defined in Section 1.
(iii) If (1 —t)(l
—t)>1—t
—indirectexchange is less costly
than direct —theequilibrium structure will be one of total indirct exchange.
The results (i) —(iii)make intuitive sense, since what they amount to
is saying that the system acts in such a way as to minimize total trans-
action costs.
In demonstrating t1-sresalts I will m±eseof th already—mentioned "conserva-
tion of imbalance" in a three—currency model, which Insures that if exchange
is balanced in one currency market it is balanced in all three markets. Thus
we can focus on the 3y market, and look for a value of D which would match the
demand for and supply of Gammas on that market. At the same time, we can make
use of a simple relationship between the structure of exchange and the excess
demand for Gammas in the 3y market. This is that any shift from direct to
indirect exchange in a clockwise direction raises the excess demand for Gammas,
while any shift from direct to indirect exchange in a counter—clockis
direction lowers it. For example, a shift from direct to irid&rect payments
from A to C will add to the demand for Gammas on the 8y market, while sub-
stituting indirect for direct payments from A to B will increase the supply
of Gammas on that market.
Bearing these points in mind, it is fairly easy to see how we can find
an approximate equilibrium. For each value of D, there will be a desired
pattern of direct and indirect exhange, that Is, a structure of exchange, with
an implied excess demand X, on the y market. As D is Increased, the desired
pattern will shift so as to increase that excess demand. The value of D
which sets XB 0, together with the implied structure of exchange, define
an approximate equilibrium.2' The derivation of the equilibrium 1) is a rather
tedious matter, and carried out in the Appendix; here I sketch out the results.14
Consider first the case where(1 —t)(1 —t)< (1—t),thatis, ya By
where indirect exchange ismore costly than direct. Theexcess demand schedule
for Gammas is illustratedin Figure 5. Flatsegments of the schedule are at
levels of D for which
transactors between some pair ofcurrencies are indifferent
between direct and indirect exchange.As D is increased there ismore clock-
wise and less counter—clockwise indirect
exchange. As the Appendix shows,
the y market Is cleared ona "flat" where transactors exchanging Gammasfor
Betas are indifferent between direct
and indirect exchange, while allother
transactors prefer direct exchange. Theresult, then, must be one of partial
indirect exchange, as defined in SectionI and illustrated in Figure 3. In
equilibrium, as the figure indicates, the clockwisdomD is
(1 —tB)/(].
—t8)(l
—t)>1.We can thiitk of this as a situation in
which holders of Gammas wishing toacquire Betas are offered a slightly better
exchange rate on indirect transactions, which isjust enpwpi to offset the
higher transaction cost.
If (1 —t8)(l
—t)>(1—t8),that is, indirect exchange is less
costly than direct, the situation is somewhatdifferent, as showninFigure 6.
!Iere D is indeterminate within the indicatedrange. The reason for the in-
determinacy becomes clear when we examine thestructure of exchange implied
by some D in that range, say D =1.For such a clockwisdom, transactorsex-
changing Betas for Gammas and Gammas for Betas will bothprefer indirect ex-
change, while all other trnsactors prefer directexchange. The implied struc-
ture must therefore be one of total indirectexchange, as illustrated in Figure
4. Since the By market clears with a volume ofzero, the exchange rate EB
and hence D are of course Indeterminate.The structure of exchange is, how-
ever, fully determined.
In each of these cases the Alpha playsa special role as a vehicle15
Qrency. It enters into more transactions than A's role in world payments would
by itself justify. The special role of A's currency arises, of course, from
the assumption that transaction costs in the exchange markets differ. We have
labelled the currencies so that tandtareboth less than t ,andthis
'r By
insures the Aiphas will be used as a vehicle.
But why should transaction costs be different? e would like some theory
to explain this; in particular, we would like to relate the structureof trans—
tlon coststo the structure of payments in some way, to make sense of the
observedfactthat vehicle currencies have historically been the currencies of
dominant trading nations. The next section tries to sketch out such a theory.
III. Endogenous Transaction Costs
Inthis section I attempt to provide an explanation of why differences
in transaction costs might arise. The analycis is based on a somewhat ad hoc
but simple and surprisingly powerful assumPtia1: that transaction costs as a
proportion of the transaction are decreasing in the volume of transactions.This
turns out to be enough to give us considerable insight bcth into the way the
structure of payments liiits the structure of exchange, and into the exchange
structure's dynamics.
Since the assumption that transaction costs decrease with the size of the
currency market is crucial to this section, we should consider (without,how-
ever, developing a fully—worked—out model) why this night be so.It is fairly
simple to tell stories which would have this result. Suppose, for instance,
that on any given day the supply and demand for a currency from transactors do
not e xactly match at the price set by cixrur tre a. Uat tle tremeet the
difference from their own holdings. Then the average stocks of currency held16
D
x
By
Figure 5
D(1 — 1(1 — t )(1—tD =(1-t)/(1-- t)
Figure 6
_____ x
3y
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D
D —(1—t )(1—t )/(1
—t)
c& By j
'418
by traders will reflect, not the overall volume of transactions, but the variab11
ofexcess demand. A growth in the volume of transactions would then in-
crease traders' costs less than proportionately if, thanks to the law of large
numbers, theiraverage stocks did not have to increase in proportion. Similar
hut more elaborate stories could also be told. Alternatively, we might simply
argue that the actual physical resources needed to ru' an exchange, whether
it is a bourse or a computer, may be largely independent of the volume of
transactions. I leave to one side the problem of modelling the industrial
organization of the exchange markets in this case, except to note that it
could hardly be perfectly competitive.
In any case, let us now consider the implications of letting transaction
costs depend on volume. If we let V ,V,Vbe the volumes of trans-
aB Byia
actions on the three markets, then we have
t F(V8) (6)
t F(V) (7)
t =F(V ) (8)
ya
where the function F( .) isassumed the same for all markets and we assume
F' <0.
If the structure of transaction costs depends in this way on the volume
of transactions, then It depends on the structure of exchange. But the struc-
ture of exchange, as we saw in Section II, is determined by the structure of
transaction costs. What we must look for, then, is an exchange structure which
Is an equilibrium in the sense that the pattern of transaction costs produced
by choicesof direct vs. indirect exchange sustains these choices.
There Is no reason why there must he only one such equilibrium; there may be
as many as six. Exchange might be partially or totally Indirect, and any one19
ofthe three currencies might serve as the vehicle.
The simultaneous choice of type of exchange structure and ofvehicle
currency makes for a very complex problem. Iwill simplify this problem by
concentrating on two more limited choices. First, we will takethe type of cx—
change structure as given and consider the choice of vehicle currency.Then
we will take the vehicle currency as given and considerthe choice of exchange
structure. These limited analyses will serve to illustrate the main principles,
while the general case can be analyzed only through numerical examples.
Let us begin, then, with the case in which we assume that the exchange
structure is one of partial indirect exchange, and we are concerned solely
with which currency is the vehicle. We start with a structureof payments like
that in Figure 2. When a particular currency is chosen as vehicle, we geta
structure of exchange which is an equilibrium if the impliedstructure of trans-
action costs confirms that currency's vehicle position. From(6) —(8),
this means that choice of a currency as vehicle must makethe volume of the two
marketsin which that currency participates larger than the volumeof the third
market.
The relationship between choice of vehicle and the volume of transactions,
for the structure of payments in Figure 2, is as follows:
Vehicle V V V
By ya
Currency
a R S—I T
B R S T-I
y R—I S T
Each currency market has a "secure1' volume arising fromcounterclockwise pay-
ments; the volume is then increased above thislevel if one of the currencies
traded serves as a vehicle. This suggests two things. First,because choosing20
a currency as vehicle swells the markets on which itis traded, we have a possibility
of multiple equilibria. Second, because of the "securet1 partof transaction
volume, there are some limits on this; the currencyof a country which plays
only a minor role in world payments will not beable to overcome the advantages
of other countries' "secure" volumes.
These points are illustrated by the examples in Figures7 and 8. In Figure
7, payments are synnnetrical, and any currency canserve as vehicle. If, for
example, the Beta were to be the vehicle, wewould have V =
V81
=10,V =5;
this would make tand tless than tand confirm the Beta as the vehicle.
aB By
On the other hand, in Figure 8, A's dominance in world payments assuresthat
the Alpha will be the vehicle currency. If one were to try to make theBeta the
vehicle, we would have V 10, V =2,V =9:the structure of trans-
ya
action costs would still lead people to carry out indirect exchange throughthe
Alpha. Similarly, using the Gamma as vehicle would produce V=9,V,
2,
V =10;the Alpha would still be preferred for indirect exchange. So the
unique equilibrium here is a structure of exchange using the Alpha asvehicle,
withV V l0,V =1.
aB ya By
In partial indirect exchange, then, only the currencies of countries impor-
tant in world payments can become vehicles; but there may be more than onesuch
currency. (Notice, by the way, that the relationshipbetween a couny1s role
in payments and the choice of vehicle currency is parallel to the requirement
that a domestic medium of exchange be a good widely desired). This leaves open
the question of which currency becomes the vehicle if more than one is capable
of taking on that role. To answer this question we need the dynamic analysis
of Section IV.
Before proceeding to this analysis, however, let us consider the otherA
Figure 7
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special case mentioned of choice of exchangestructure: the choice between
partial and total indirect exchange given the choiceof vehicle currency,
Suppose that wetakeit as knownthatthe Alpha will be the vehiclecurrency,
and the structure of payments isagain that of Figure 2. Then the possible
structures of exchange are (i)Partia]. indirectexchan-,e: V8 =R,V8
=S—I,
V =T;(ii)Total Indirect exchange: V=R÷ S, V =0,V=S+ T. ya By
We know from Section II that partial indirectexchange can be an equilibrium
if (1 —t8)(l
—t)<(1—t8),or, substituting,
[1— F(R)J[l —F(T)J<[1—F(S —I)] (9)
This can be the case if F does not decrease toorapidly as volume increases.
On the other hand, total indirect exchangerequires that (1 —ta8)(l_t)>
(1—t1),
which means that we must have
[1 —F(R+ S)][l —F(S÷ T)] >[1—F(0)) (10)
This is more likely to be the case if F does decreaserapidly with volume.
however, the left—hand side of (10) is larger than that of(9), while the right—
hand side is smaller; therefore (9) and (10)are not mutually exclusive.
One might expect that total indirectexchange would be more likely if
some one country were very dominant in worldpayments. This is true in the
limited sense that predominance of onecountry may make partial indirect ex-
change impossible. In (9), increasing R and T whilereducing S —Imay reverse
the inequality. Even this is notcertain, however. If
[1 —F(co)J2 1—F(0), which is fully consistent with F' <0,the exchange
structure will always be only partially indirectno matter how predominant
one country is.
To summarize, then, If transaction costsare a decreasing function of
the volume of transactions we can relate thestructure of exchange to the23
structure of payments in economically sensible ways. Onlythe currency of
a country which is important in world payments can serve as aninternational
medium of exchange; the predominance of one country makes it more likelythat
all transactions between the othcrs will take place indirectly.While the
structure of exchange is thus limited by the structure of payments, however,
there may still be several possible exchange structures. To determinewhich
structure emerges, we need a dynamic analysis, to which we now turn.
iv.Dynamicsof the Exchange Structure
Since there may be several possible equilibrium structures of exchange,
we must have some way of determining which structure actually prevails. The
most plausible way of doing this is to specify a process of disequilibrium
adjustment which lets us determine the eventual equilibrium given the initial
conditions. This leaves open the question of where initial conditions come
from; but if we can show how the structure of exchange changes over time this
will usually be enough.
Let us suppose, then, a dynamic process of the following kind. Decisions
on direct versus indirect exchange will be based, not on actual transaction
costs, but on perceived costs e e e •Theseperceived costs will be
aB
adjusted over time in response to the gap between them and the actual trans-
action costs:
then X(tB —t:B)
(11)
A(t— t) (12)
. e t =X(t —t ) (13)
rur 'a
Since the peeived transactions costs determine the structure of exchange,
and the structure of exchange in turn determines actual transaction costs, the
differential equations (11) —(13) capturethe complete dynamic behavior of
exchange.24
A general analysis of a system of threenonlinear differentialequations
would, of course, be very complex. Wecan, however, learn something by con-
sidering special cases in which the problem
collapses to manageable size. What
I will do in this section is considertwo such cases.
Consider first a situation in which the functionF and the structure of
payments rule out total indirect exchange, and also ruleout the Gamma as a
vehicle currency. (Sufficient conditions forthis are
[1 —F(°o)]2<1—F(O),and that in Figure 2 we have R —Igreater than
S and/or T). Then we need only be concernedwith the choice between the
Alpha and the Beta as a vehicle of partial indirectexchange. This choice
depends on a comparison of transaction costs in the marketsin which both
currencies do not participate, i.e., on t—t
8y ycz
Figure 9 shows the dynamic system. On the vertical axis is shownthe
perceived difference in transaction costs, on the horizontal theactual dif-
ference. The relationship between perceived and actualcosts is shown by
UVWX, which can be explained as follows. If transactioncosts are perceived
to be lower in the 8y market than in theya market, the Beta will be chosen as
the vehicle currency and the actual differencein costs will be —OV. If, on
the other hand, transactions are believed to becheaper in the ya market, the
Alpha will be chosen as a vehicle and the actual difference intransaction
costs will be OW.
The dynamics of the system are obvious, andare indicated by arrowheads.
If the perceived difference in transactioncosts is less than the actual
(below the 450 line), t —twill rise; if more, t—twill fall. There
By ya
are, as drawn, two stable equilibria, one at a,corresponding to theuse of
the Alpha as vehicle currency, the other atb, corresponding to the use of the/
U
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Beta. There need not, however, be two equilibria. If V were to shift to
the right of the origin, the equilibrium with the Beta as vehicle currencywould
disappear; similarly, a leftward shift of W could eliminate the possiblerole
of the Alpha. This provides a clue to how the structure of exchange night
evolve over time, to which I will return in a moment.
First, however, let us consider another special case. Suppose that we can
be certain that the Alpha will be the vehicle currency, so that the only
question is whether indirect exchange will be partial or total.(A sufficient
condition is R —I,T —Iboth greater than S in Figure 2, together with the
assumption that we do not start from a position of total indirect exchange
using the Beta or Gamma). Then we can focus on the difference between trans-
action costs in direct and indirect exchange,
(1 —t8)(l
—
tya)
—(1—
tBy).
We need not draw the dynamic system in this case, since it will look just
like that in Figure 9 except for a relabelling of the axes. Again there will
be at most two stable equilibria, one corresponding to partial and the other
to total indirect exchange. If country A is sufficiently predominant only
total indirect exchange will be a stable equilibrium; if transaction costs do
not fall enough with volume, only partial indirect exchange will be possible.
Let us consider, finally, how the structure of exchange might evolve over
time. If the exchange structure is in stable equilibrium, the only things that
can change that are changes in the technology of transactions or, more interesting-
ly, in the structure of payments..Jro see how changes in the structure of. pay-
ments alter the exchange structure, let us return to the case illustrated in
Figure 9, where the question is whether or B's currency will be the vehicle.
In Figure 10 we suppose that the system is initially in equilibrium at. b,
i.e., the Beta is the international medium of exchange. Over time, we suppose,28
A's role in world payments grows and B's shrinks. The effect is to shift both
V and W right, say to V', W'. At the point at which V passes the origin (which
is when T —Iin Figure 2 becomes larger than S) the role of the Beta col-
lapses, and the Alpha becomes the vehicle currency. Eventually the system
reaches a new equilibrium at c, with the Alpha serving as the international
medium of exchange. Interestingly, if the structure ofpayments were then to
shift hack to its original position, so that the lines U' V• W'X' shift
back to UV, WX, there would nonetheless have been a permanent change in the
structure of exchange from that implied by b tothat Implied by a.
This sequence of events suggests two important featuresof the dynamics
of the exchange structure. The first is that the international monetary system
is subject to "tipping"; gradual change in the underlyingstructure of pay-
ments can, when it reaches a critical point, lead to abrupt changesIn the struc-
ture of exchange. The second feature is the way permanent changescan result
from temporary events. If a country temporarily holds a dominant positionin
world payments which establishes its currency as an internationalmedium of
exchange, its currency may continue to play thatrole even after the commer-
cial preeminence of the country has passed.
In this paper I have attempted to answer in a systematic waythe rather
subtle question of why some currencies have functioned asinternational media
of exchange. The model set forth in this paper is, of course, highlysim-
plified. Nonetheless, it gives results which look asif they have something todo
with the actualexperienceof international monetary history. And the model
shows that it is possible to deal in at least a rudimentary waywith the role
of transaction costs in international financial markets.29
Notes
-"Authors who have discussed the role of vehicle currencies, and stressed the
parallel with the use of money in domestic exchange, include Kindleberger
(1976), Swoboda (1968), McKinnon (1969), and Chrystal (1977). DiscussIons
of transaction costs and the structure of exchange in closed economies include
papers by Niehans (1969) and Jones (1976), as well as a distinguished tradition
going back to Jevons (1875) and Menger (1892).
similar approximation is made by Jones (1976), who assumes in his model of
domestic exchange that costs of trading have no effect on Wairasian market—
clearing prices.
-'Note that we are finding a value of D which would setX, —0if the implied
choices of direct vs. indirect exchange took place without transaction costs.
'To the extent that the costs of transactions arise from the necessity of
holding working balances in currencies, transaction costs will also depend on
the holding costs. I.e., if the Beta is expected to depreciate, this would
raise t and trelative to t •Thismay be important in explaining how
Ta
a vehicle currency, once established, can lose its special role, see foot-
note 5, below.
1Strictly speaking, an exchange structure could also be disrupted by changes
in the perceived costs of holding working balances in different currencies, as
already mentioned in footnote 4. Thus one way of intcrpreting Figure 10 is
that a "loss of confidence" In the Beta raises trelative to t •This
By
could lead to an unraveling of the Beta's role as vehicle. Notice that even
if the loss in confidence is only temporary, it can still have a permanent
effect on the structure of exchange.30
Appendix: Clockwisdom and the Equilibrium Structure of Exchange
In Section II a concept of approximate equilibrium in the presence of
transaction costs was developed and it was stated that:
(i) If (1 —tB)(l
—t)<(1—t8),the approximate equilibrium will
be one with D(1 —tB)/(l
—t8)(l
—t),and where the only indirect ex-
change is of Gammas for Betas;
(ii) If (1 —taB)(l
—t)
(1 —tB),D will be indeterminate in the range
(1 —t8)/(l
—ta8)(l
—
tya)
to (1 —ta8)(l
—t)/(l
—t8),
and all Beta—
Gamma exchanges will take place indirectly. The purpose of this appendix isto
demonstrate these propositions.
In making this demonstration, we can use two helpful aspects of the model
already mentioned in the text. First, because of the budget constraints of
the countries, it is sufficient to consider only one market,e.g. the By
market. Second, the excess demand for Gammas on the By market is non—
decreasing in D, since increases in D can never encourage a shift away from
clockwise or towards counterclockwise indirect exchange. This means that if
for D slightly less than D0 we find <0,while for D slfghtly more than
we find X8 >0,all equilibrium values of D must lie in the range
D0 to D1.
Let us begin by analyzing the choice between direct and indirect exchange.
Consider the example of an exchange of Aiphas for Gammas. In direct exchange,
after transaction costs one could get E _l(l —t)Gammasper Alpha. In
yct ycx
indirect exchange one could getEaBEBY(l —tuB)(l
—
tBy)Gammas per Alpha. Clear-
ly the breakpoint is E E E=D=(1—t)/(l —t)(l —t).Asimilar a88yya yct - By
exercise can be carried out for all such exchanges, yielding critical values of
as shown in Table A—i. For entries below the diagonal in the table the
value is that of the minimum D which will lead to indirect exchange; for entries
above the diagonal it is the maximum.T
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Given a value of D, together with information onthe structure of trans-
action costs, we can determine for each typeof exchange whether direct or
indirect exchange is preferred. I will use a"-F" to indicate a preference
for indirect exchange, a ti_n to indicate a preferencefor direct exchange, and
a "0" to indicate indifference.
Wecannow proceed to cases. Recall that we havelabelled countries so
that t6, tboth less than t8 .Also,the underlying structure of payments
is assumed to be that shown in Figure 2.
Case 1:(1 —tB)(l
—t)<(1—tB).
In this case it is immediately clear
that D =(1—tB)/(l
—tB)(i
—t)corresponds to an equilibrium. Ref er-
ring to Table A—i, wehavea matrix of preferred exchanges
a B y
a
B
1 0
Thus exchanges of Gammas for Betas may take placeeither directly or indirectly,
which is consistent with an equilibrium of partialindirect exchange as illus-
trated in Figure 3. This equilibrium is unique. To seethis, note that for a
slightly higher D the matrix becomes
a B y
a
B
which leads to =S—I(1; whIle for a 9lightly 1o-ier ) we have the ntrix
a B y
cx
B33
which leads to X =—I<0.The unique equilibrium exchange structure, then,
By
is partial indirect exchange with the Alpha as vehicle.
Case 2:(1 —t)(l—t)> (1—t).Inthis case, any value of D in the a3 ye By
range from D0 —(1—t)(l—t)(l—t)to =(1—t)(l—t)/(l—t) By ctB ye ye By
will lead to a matrix of preferred exchanges
a B
+
y +
Thispattern, which means that all payments between B and C take place indirectly,
corresponds to an equilibrium of total indirect exchange, as shown in Figure 4.
This is the unique equilibrium structure although D is indeterminate. If 1)were
slightly above D1, the matrix of preferred exchanges would be
a B y
a
B —
+
which would produce an excess demand for Gammas of S —Ion the By market. If
D were slightly below D0, the matrix would be
a B y
+
y
which would produce an excess supply of S Gammas on the By market. So the
equilibrium structure of exchange must be total indirect exchange with the
Alpha as vehicle.References
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